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Abstract: Attalus III based the position of his state in Asia Minor mostly on his military suc-
cesses. Nevertheless, he skilfully enhanced these successes with diplomacy. His most important 
tools in this respect became euergetism, philhellenism, as well as making appropriate use of the 
popularity that was brought by his victories over the Galatians. Establishing relationships with
the Greek states of Asia Minor was of considerable importance for the Attalids’ state. In this re-
spect, Attalus’ achievements are indisputable.
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Attalus I was the Attalid who introduced the Kingdom of Pergamum to the great politics 
of the Mediterranean world. As a result of his active policy in the Aegean basin, the dy-
nasty captured bases in the Aegean Sea, marking a strong manifestation of its presence 
in the region as well as establishing relationships with numerous Greek states and with 
Rome.1 Attalus I was famous, above all, for his military actions, but he is sometimes con-
sidered to have been less successful in the fi eld of diplomacy. This particularly applies to 
references to Eumenes II, during whose reign Pergamum’s power reached its zenith.2 In 
fact, Attalus I engaged in numerous military actions. As in the case of the other Hellenis-
tic monarchs, war was an inseparable part of the existence of the kings of Pergamum, and 
Attalus was no exception in this respect. War was, as a matter of fact, often an extension 
of diplomacy. In the complicated circumstances that Asia Minor witnessed in the third 
century,3 only a dexterous combination of diplomacy with military actions could result 
in attaining ambitious goals.
Asia Minor in the third century was an area where the infl uences of the most powerful 
dynasties – the Seleucids and the Ptolemies in particular – clashed, constituting a chance 
for the minor states of the region. Emancipation of various dynasts in the region led 
to the establishment not only of the state of the Attalids, but also of the kingdoms of 
1 For Attalus I’s policy in the Aegean, cf. Allen 1971; 1983, 65–75; Grabowski 2016, 82–93. 
2 Allen 1983, 27.
3 All dates in the paper are BC.
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Bithynia, Pontus or Cappadocia.4 Since the 270s, fi rst the invasions and then the Celtic 
settlement had become a new and important factor. Finally, the Greek cities of Asia Mi-
nor constituted another signifi cant issue.
The poleis of western Asia Minor must have drawn particular attention from the 
Attalids. The region was densely populated. The Greek cities that existed there were 
characterised by great diversity in terms of their political position as well as demograph-
ic and economic potential. Apart from the weaker cities, which recognised the superior 
power of different Hellenistic kings, there also existed some strong poleis, predominant-
ly wealthy, with a long and rich history, and sometimes possessing vast territories. Most 
importantly, their fi nancial resources allowed them to keep their own armies consisting 
not only of their citizens, but also of mercenary divisions. Thus although the majority of 
the region was made up of small communities, a few of them possessed a signifi cant po-
litical potential. The two most important cities of Ionia, Ephesus and Miletus, remained 
almost throughout the whole third century under the control of the Seleucids or the Ptole-
mies. Both amassed considerable riches and still enjoyed wide prestige. Ephesus, thanks 
to the steps taken by Lysimachus, which was transferring the city to a new place and 
increasing its population with settlers from Lebedus and Colophon, remained the biggest 
polis of the region. The city’s chief assets were its location on the trade routes as well as 
the control it exerted over a rather extensive and fertile region. Miletus was the subject of 
Lysimachus’ efforts, then the Seleucids and the Ptolemies both desired to possess it. The 
epigraphic evidence indicates that although a twenty-year period of Ptolemaic rule was 
exasperating for the citizens of Miletus, their relationships with the Seleucids developed 
much better. The city and the oracle in Didyma, which was under its control, were in the 
rulers’ good graces and enjoyed high prestige.5 Smyrna was also an important centre. It 
quickly associated itself with the Seleucids and consistently forged bonds with this dy-
nasty. This loyalty did not express itself only in the development of the cult of the mem-
bers of the Seleucid family, but was also manifested during the Third Syrian War. At that 
time, Smyrna supported Seleucus II and Seleucus III, in exchange for which signifi cant 
privileges were bestowed upon it.6 Cyzicus was one of the most powerful Greek cities 
in Asia Minor. The most important polis of Propontis possessed, in Greek terms, a vast 
territory, which together with the profi ts trade constituted the basis of the city’s economy. 
It retained independence during the whole Hellenistic period. It was just the power of 
Cyzicus, as well as the presence of the other poleis, such as Ilium, Lampsacus or Abydos, 
that effectively prevented the Attalids’ northbound expansion in the sea region. Another 
infl uential and important centre in the region was Byzantium, the city that gained its 
wealth predominantly due to trade, but also through controlling a substantial territory in 
the Thracian region.7 It was the presence of these and other independent poleis in Asia 
Minor that made the political actions in the region particularly complicated.
4 See Heinen 1984, 425–426.
5 OGIS 213 = I.Didyma, no. 48; OGIS 214 = Welles 1934, no. 5; OGIS 227 = Welles 1934, no. 22; 
I.Milet, no. 1, cf. also App. Syr. 65; Paus. 1.16.3; Bringmann – von Steuben 1995, 334–346, nos. 280–282.
6 OGIS 222; 228; 229; I.Smyrna, no. 573; Robert 1937, 90; see also Ma 2002, 49–50; Capdetrey 2007, 
207–208.
7 In truth, the city had to a pay a tribute to the Celtic state of Tylis, but its size (80 talents: Plb. 4.46) also 
proves the scale of wealth the Byzantines accumulated.
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The poleis of Asia Minor also possessed a long tradition of diplomatic activity. In the 
Hellenistic world, dominated by large monarchies, poleis seemingly found themselves 
in a diffi cult situation as far as conducting a foreign policy is concerned. This was how it 
was in the case of great politics. The Greek cities, however, found some new platforms 
for their activity. Attempts at arbitration were eagerly taken up, the treaties of proxenia, 
asylia and isopoliteia were made,8 and cooperation in the fi elds of religion and economy 
was developed. Some regional forms of cooperation were also continued. Consisting of 
numerous Ionian poleis, the Ionian League played the role of such a connector in the 
religious fi eld. In the period of the Diadochi, the Troad League was set up.9 Organised 
around the temple of Athena Ilias in Ilium, it was also an organisation of a predominantly 
religious character.
The rivalry of the powers was also in the cities’ favour. It was already during the 
Diadochi’s fi ghts that the issue of the Greek cities’ independence became a new, im-
portant propaganda slogan, which was used for the fi rst time by Polyperchon.10 Taken 
up and practically applied to a much larger extent by Antigonus I Monophthalmus, and 
then Ptolemy,11 it became a signifi cant tool of political fi ght and the kings’ diplomacy 
as regards the poleis. The problem of the poleis’ independence from the very beginning 
was treated instrumentally, but the propaganda slogan in question also opened some new 
opportunities for the Greek cities.12 Each Hellenistic ruler had to have this issue in mind. 
Friendly relationships with the Greek cities made the free draft of mercenaries possible 
and considerably facilitated implementing the policy in a particular region. The Greeks’ 
support was the basis for the existence of the Hellenistic monarchies. Therefore, devel-
oped royal euergetism could be observed. The above factors must have been taken into 
account by the Attalids when they built their position in the world: particularly in the 
light of the very well developed urban life in Asia Minor. Politics in the region demanded 
dexterity as well as appropriate dosing of fl attery and pressure. Traditional bonds and the 
complicated network of local confl icts between the Hellenistic powers should also have 
been taken into consideration.
The policy of Attalus I’s predecessors was characterised by great caution. Both Phi-
letaerus and Eumenes I slowly but adeptly built the dynasty’s position in the region. 
Their prudence, but also their ability to gradually attain goals, can be seen in particular, 
for example, through their policy towards the Seleucids. Although Philetaerus achieved 
a considerable degree of independence, he offi cially emphasised his dependence in the 
relationship with Antiochus I, the best example of which is the iconography of the coins 
that he minted.13 A similar policy was led by his successor, Eumenes I. Even after his 
victory over Antiochus II in the battle near Ephesus, circa 261, he did not assume the 
8 Some of the leaders of this kind of activity in the Greek world were Cyzicus and Miletus: McShane 
1964, 51–52.
9 The League is proved to have existed in 306 (SIG3 330 = I.Ilium, no. 1).
10 Diod. 18.56.
11 Diod. 19.61.3; 62.1.
12 As regards the role that the issue of the poleis’ independence played in the diadochs’ and their 
successors’ politics, see Heuss 1937, 216–244; Koehn 2007, 48–50; Dmitriev 2011, 114–142.
13 The obverse showed an image of Seleucus I, and the reverse Athena, the protector of Pergamum: 
Newell 1936, 1–34; Westermark 1961, 20–21.
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royal title. However, the coins with a portrait of Philetaerus – not Seleucus, as had been 
the case before – probably minted after this victorious battle, prove the fact that Eumenes 
stressed his independence from the Seleucids.14
The actions of the fi rst two representatives of the dynasty in their dealings with the 
western and northern Greek communities of Asia Minor were characterised by similar 
cautiousness. Their policy led to reinforcing the dynasty’s control over the valley of the 
River Caïcus. They both delineate the main lines of Pergamenian diplomacy – euer-
getism and philhellenism. Based on those tools, Philetaerus dexterously tightened the 
relationships with the neighbouring cities. By using substantial fi nancial resources,15 he 
developed the strategy of diplomatic investments. He generously supported the cities of 
Asia Minor, e.g. Cyzicus, Cyme and Pitane in Aeolis, Mysian Aigai, as well as Beotian 
Tespiai and Oropus, situated in inland Greece.16 He also skilfully used the threat of the 
Galatian invasion to create his image as the Philhellene who showed care towards Greek 
cities.17 Eumenes I continued this policy. A particular place in the diplomacy of the rul-
ers of Pergamum was held by Greek sanctuaries, their undeniable success having been 
underlined by assuming the status of Delphi’s proxenoi.18 At the same time, the fi rst 
Attalids strove not to emphasise their position as the rulers of Pergamum while making 
donations.19 The idea behind this was to create an image of the rulers of Pergamum that 
was less monarchic, but closer to the tradition of a polis, in comparison with the other 
Hellenistic kings. A similar goal was to be achieved by maintaining in the capital tradi-
tional institutions of a Greek polis, as well as the Attalids’ residence, which was devoid 
of regal sumptuousness.20
Philetaerus and his followers therefore succeeded in building friendly relationships 
with the numerous neighbouring Greek cities in the region as well as creating an image 
of the Attalids as defenders and protectors of Greek culture and the Hellenes in north-
west Asia Minor. When establishing his rule in 241, Attalus I had already had a very good 
point of departure, which was the basis of his power and the relationships with the com-
munities of Asia Minor created by his predecessors. Eumenes I’s capture of Elaea was 
14 The inscription concerning Eumenes I’s agreement with the revolting mercenaries from Philetaireia 
and Attaleia has a similar tone. For this topic, see Westermark 1961, 12–13; Allen 1983, 23–25; Kosmetatou 
2001, 111–114; Evans 2012: 15–18.
15 Philetaerus took over the treasure of 9000 talents, which had been deposited in Pergamum and entrusted 
to him by Lysimachus: Strab. 13.4.1.
16 OGIS 310–312; 335; 748–749, I.Orop., no. 388; cf. Bringmann – von Steuben 1995, nos. 86–89, 251, 
252, 256–257. In the case of Oropus, the benefactor was Eumenes, Philetaerus’ brother. For this aspect of 
Philetaerus’ politics, cf. Schalles 1985, 33–41. For the contacts with Cyme, cf. Manganaro 2000; Gauthier 2003; 
Buraselis 2012, 252–253. For Cyzicus, cf. Atkinson 1968, 44–45; Hansen 1971, 19; Allen 1983, 14–15, 137.
17 Donations for Cyzicus were a back-up in the case of the threatening confl ict with the Galatians.
18 Holleaux 1938, 9–16. Further manifestations of the importance that religious propaganda played in 
Philetaerus ’ diplomacy were the funding of Apollon’s temple in Aigai (OGIS 312), or the refunding of the 
Magna Mater (Mother Goddess) sanctuary on the hill, south of Pergamum, see McShane 1964, 42; Allen 
1983, 15–16.
19 The rulers of Pergamum appeared in the inscriptions as Περγαμεύς: Virgilio 1993, 17.
20 Koehn 2007, 61. It cannot be ruled out that the Attalids used in this aspect some prestige which had 
been enjoyed by the city of Pergamum before. As a matter of fact, little is known about the history of the city 
before the Attalids, but the temple of the Mother Goddess, which was situated in the city’s close proximity, 
might have been of some importance: Allen 1983, 15–16. 
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the key factor in terms of greater political ambitions. The city became the Attalids’ main 
port.21 Elaea became the dynasty’s window on the Aegean Sea, which must have given 
the rulers of Pergamum a new political impulse.22 Attalus was able to actively join the
Aegean policy. His major focus, however, was still Asia Minor, as it was there that
the most vital interests of his state were to be found. Against the permanent rivalry be-
tween the Ptolemies and the Seleucids, which also concerned Asia Minor, and in the face 
of the still unsolved problem of the Celtic threat, Pergamum had a chance to become an 
attractive alternative for the Greek cities of the region.
The long period of Atallus I’s rule, particularly his activity in Asia Minor, is relatively 
poorly documented in terms of sources. Moreover, the documentation that we possess fo-
cuses above all on military aspects. The literary accounts are scarce. As a matter of fact, 
only the passage by Polybius (5.77–78) dedicated to the king’s expedition of 218 pro-
vides us with a little more information. Epigraphic sources contain merely fragmentary 
pieces of information, on the basis of which it is rather diffi cult to create a cohesive im-
age of his politics; specifi cally, considering the fact that for Asia Minor it was a particu-
larly turbulent time and the political situation changed extremely dynamically. This was 
the time of the Third Syrian War between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids and the “War 
of Brothers” among the Seleucids themselves, which brought about immense weaken-
ing of the dynasty, so far the most important factor guaranteeing stability in Asia Minor. 
The battles between Seleucus II and Antiochus Hierax, in which the other states of Asia 
Minor were also involved, deepened the chaos. Actually, the end of the civil war was not 
synonymous with a state of stability in the Seleucids’ kingdom. Similarly to Antiochus 
Hierax before, the following representative of the Seleucid rule in Asia Minor, Achaeus 
strove to create an independent state in the region. Initially, he remained loyal towards 
the new king, Antiochus III, but in 220 he assumed the royal title.23 Eventually, Attalus 
and the Greek cities had to face up to the still unsolved Galatian problem. It seems that 
this was just the last factor that constituted, by and large, the key to his diplomacy. Atta-
lus achieved a series of victories in the fi ghts with the Galatians, both on his own and by 
21 It kept this position until 188, when the Treaty of Apamea gave the Attalids Ephesus, which took over 
the role of the most important port of the Kingdom of Pergamum. For Elaea, see Pirson 2004; 2014.
22 It is very likely that Eumenes I embarked on the programme of building the Pergamum fl eet; however, 
the fi rst source information concerning its activity refers to the period of Attalus’ rule, specifi cally to the First 
Macedonian War. The silence of the sources need not be surprising. Each state’s fl eet entered the scope of the 
ancient authors’ interest the moment it started its military actions, particularly in the confl icts, the character of 
which was not merely continental. Ordinary, everyday actions did not evoke any emotions. In the fi rst period, the
fl eet was probably the means, the purpose of which was to improve communication and connections with
the maritime cities of Asia Minor, particularly with the poleis of continental Greece.
23 Polybius (4.48.11) attributes this decision to Achaeus’ exaggerated ambition; he had supposedly 
become audacious following his successes in the war against Pergamum. Researchers have tried to explain 
the decision in various ways. It has been suggested that perhaps Achaeus borrowed the idea from Antiochus 
Hierax, who had had the royal title and had also resided in Sardis. It has also been pointed out that – as is 
indicated, for example, by the coins minted in Sardis even before the usurpation, which bore dynastic symbols 
– Achaeus might have truly believed in his right to the throne. The hypothesis that his fear of Hermeias’ 
intrigues or other unfriendly people surrounding Antiochus drove Achaeus to do such a thing is another guess. 
Further, it cannot be excluded that Achaeus received false news of the king’s death in the eastern provinces. 
Finally, Achaeus might have been infl uenced by Ptolemaic diplomacy. Cf. Schmitt 1964, 171–173; Huss 
1977, 35–36; Will 1979–1982, II: 23–26; Ma 2002, 57; Grabowski 2011, 117; Chrubasik 2016, 84, 102–112.
TOMASZ GRABOWSKI18
means of his mercenaries in the service of Antiochus Hierax.24 The successes in the con-
fl ict with the Galatians played a considerable role in strengthening the Attalids’ power and 
consolidating their state. On the rising tide of his attainments, Attalus I assumed the royal 
title. From that moment on he could introduce himself as the one who, in accord with the
Hellenistic royal ideology, ruled over chora dorikteos. Victorious campaigns against 
the Galatians brought Attalus fame and genuine popularity among the citizens of the
Greek cities. Propaganda popularised the image of Attalus as the one who had saved
the Greeks from the barbarians, and this motif became one of the most important tools 
that the king used in diplomacy. The successes were incarnated in the form of the monu-
ment that was erected in Pergamum.25 The references to the fi ghts with the Galatians can 
be found in the inscriptions from Asia Minor.26 But, they were also used by Attalus in the 
politics beyond this region. The monuments erected in Delos and Athens27 propagated 
the image of Attalus as the defender of the Hellenistic civilisation, as a result of which he 
facilitated the process of initiating and tightening the relationships with the Greek inland 
states as well as in the island world.28 The memories of the Celtic invasions of Greece 
at the beginning of the 270s were still alive, but certainly such a propaganda motif must 
have worked effectively in Asia Minor. It is much more diffi cult to reconstruct the ac-
tions of Pergamum’s diplomacy during the fi ghts with the Galatians as regards the Greek 
cities. Attalus refused to pay tribute to the Galatians,29 but we still do not know whether 
he managed to convince the other Greek poleis to do so.
The Greek cities in Asia Minor must have been the object of Attalus’ efforts – par-
ticularly in the situation in which the king of Pergamum found himself at the time. Obvi-
ously, the Seleucids’ problems constituted a great chance for Attalus to extend his infl u-
ence. Nevertheless, the following Seleucid kings (Seleucus II, Seleucus III, and also, for 
some time, Antiochus III) as well as the strategoi representing their interests (Antiochus 
Hierax and Achaeus) were dangerous opponents. In the civil war between Seleucus II 
and Antiochus Hierax, Attalus initially assumed a wait-and-see attitude. After the defeat 
24 Texts of the inscriptions placed on the monument to commemorate the victory list the Galatians 
before Antiochus Hierax. According to Launey (1949–1950, 305–306), this indicates that the Galatians were 
Hierax’s allies, not ordinary mercenaries. However, this argument is not convincing, as exposing the fi ghts 
with the Galatians was the principal motif in Attalus’ propaganda. In this way he gained the position of the 
most important defender of the Greeks and the Hellenistic culture. The chronology of Attalus’ actions is 
diffi cult to establish; see Allen 1983, 28–35; Strobel 1996, 257–262; Ma 2002, 45–47.
25 OGIS 273–279; cf. Schalles 1985, 51–104; Mitchell 2003, 284–285.
26 Cf. list of monuments and inscriptions in Allen 1983, 195–199.
27 IG XI 4.1109–1110; Paus. 1.25.2; Bringmann – von Steuben 1995, 221–223, nos. 173–174. Cf. Schalles 
1985, 60–64. The details of the context in which Epigenes’ statue was built are unknown, but it is valid to 
think of it as a form of commemorating Attalus’ victory against the Galatians.
28 The Galatian elements of Attalus’ propaganda and diplomacy might have, by and large, facilitated 
establishing the relationships with the Aetolian League. What the Attalids and the Aetolians had in common 
were similar propaganda accents which they applied in building their image in the Greek world. Both of 
them emphasised their role in defending the Greek world against the barbarian Celts. Cf. Nachtergael 1975, 
209–391; Schalles 1985, 51–127; Hannestad 1994; Strobel 1994; Marszal 2000, 191–212; Kosmetatou 2003, 
170–171; Mitchell 2003, 284–287.
29 He is supposed to have done so as the fi rst ruler of Asia Minor: Liv. 38.16.14. It cannot be ruled out 
that the victory in the battle with the Galatians was also ensured by Philetaerus. In spite of this, he still paid 
tribute to the Galatians, cf. Allen 1983, 31, note 8, 136–137.
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which Seleucus II suffered in the battle of Ancyra (circa 240/239), he had to accept Hi-
erax’s power in Asia Minor. In this way, Antiochus Hierax became a natural enemy of 
Attalus and, as we know, the ruler of Pergamum defeated him in a few battles. We do not 
have information concerning any attempts made by Attalus to win over the other king-
doms of Asia Minor. They are, however, very unlikely, as their interests did not coincide 
with those of Pergamum. Moreover, the rulers of those states were mostly associated 
with the Seleucids. The kings of Cappadocia (Ariarathes III) and Pontus (Mithridates II) 
were married to the daughters of Antiochus II, and Antiochus Hierax took as his wife the 
daughter of Ziaelas, the king of Bithynia.30 The marriages became entrenched in the Se-
leucids’ political strategy, which pragmatically assumed the independence of the states, 
the conquest of which was impossible. The dynastic relationships allowed close relation-
ships to be maintained with them. Obviously, in the face of the complicated relationships 
in the Seleucid family as well as the civil war, the rulers of Cappadocia, Bithynia and 
Pontus had to decide which side of the confl ict they were on. Probably both Mithridates 
and Ariarathes supported Antiochus Hierax.31 We do not know if the king of Bithynia 
was also involved in the “War of Brothers,” but taking into consideration the fact that 
Hierax was his son-in-law, Ziaelas too would have surely taken his side. Spice was added 
to the affair by the fact that Ziaelas was also closely associated with Ptolemy III.32 The 
development of the situation in Asia Minor must have been observed with interest in 
Alexandria, especially in the face of the threat potentially hanging over the Ptolemaic 
provinces newly regained or conquered in the recently fi nished Third Syrian War. Con-
sidering the principles of the Ptolemaic politics, Ptolemy III’s sympathies were probably 
on Hierax’s side. It was his actions, in fact, that meant weakening the Seleucids’ power 
in this region. As far as we know, Ptolemy did not intervene in the “War of Brothers,” 
although he supported Hierax when he contended with the mutiny of his Galatian mer-
cenaries in Magnesia.33 Therefore, considering the fact that Antiochus Hierax was one of 
the most important opponents of Attalus I, these three kingdoms (Bithynia, Cappadocia 
and Pontus) were beyond the scope of Pergamum’s diplomacy interests.
In this situation, the importance of poleis increased for Attalus, who must have ac-
tively sought their support. In addition to euergetism,34 the image of the defender against 
the barbaric Galatians was surely the most important trump card in the hands of the king 
of Pergamum. It was around this time, fi lled with fi ghting, that the title Soter (“saviour”) 
began to accompany Attalus’ name.35 Political marriages were a traditional diplomatic 
tool, frequently used by the Hellenistic kings. They were treated as an extremely conven-
ient form of bilateral friendly relationships. A personal relationship was created through 
dynastic bonds. All the more interesting is the case of Attalus I, who did not choose his 
30 Diod. 31.19.6; Just. 38.5; Porph. FGrH 260, F32, 6, 8; cf. Seibert 1967, 56–59.
31 Porph. FGrH 260, F32, 8; see Heinen 1984, 429.
32 In the letter to the citizens of Kos (SIG3 456, ll. 22–26 = Welles 1934, no. 25, ll. 22–26) the king of 
Bithynia emphasised his close relationships with Ptolemy III, whom he addressed as philos kai symmachos.
33 Porph. FGrH 260, F32, 8; Beyer-Rotthoff 1993, 74–76; Hölbl 2001, 54; Huss 2001, 363, contra Will 
1979–1982, I: 299.
34 Cf. Attalus I’s donations, collected in Bringmann – von Steuben 1995, nos. 26, 76, 91, 92, 103, 172–
175, 226, 228, 231, 253, 272 (certain) and nos. 27, 262, 374, 394, 415 (uncertain but likely).
35 Virgilio 1993, 38–39; Muccioli 2013, 168.
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wife from one of the royal families, but married Apollonis, the daughter of a citizen of 
Cyzicus.36 In this way, the king of Pergamum strove for three goals. First, he emphasised 
his image as being less monarchic in comparison to the other families, as well as the “ur-
ban” character of his rule.37 Second, he tightened relations with Cyzicus. Lastly, it cannot 
be ruled out that he opened the path to establishing friendly relations with Miletus, which 
was regarded as a metropolis by Cyzicus.38
The fi rst evidence of the use of new topics in the Attalids’ propaganda, this time of 
a religious-mythological nature, comes from the 220s. Attalus I founded an impressive 
building complex at Delphi, which occupied a special place in Apollo’s sanctuary. The 
entire architectural layout included a terrace on which a number of statues and a stoa were 
placed. This was the only building which interrupted the temenos wall. It was situated 
directly next to the tomb of the hero Pyrrhos-Neoptolemos, son of Achilles and father of 
Pergamos, the eponymous hero of Pergamum and one of the Attalids’ ancestors. This was 
probably the fi rst manifestation of the Attalids’ syngeneia.39 The mythological themes were 
subsequently developed. In fact, the Attalids had to build a cohesive genealogy which 
would have allowed them to compete with the other Hellenistic monarchies in the fi eld 
of religious policy. They propagated the idea of their descent from Zeus through Dio-
nysus Cathegemon and Heracles, the character of the Arcadian demi-god, Telephus, who
was considered the legendary predecessor of the dynasty, having become the liaison.40 It was
also through the character of Heracles that they built the link connecting them with Alex-
ander the Great.41 The role of Attalus was signifi cant in this respect. The fi rst indisputable 
evidence of the Attalids using Telephus and the Greek world’s acceptance of this genealogy 
is the inscription engraved on Telephus’ statue for the temple in Aegina in 209.42 This was 
yet another convenient tool for diplomacy in the relationships with the Greeks.
36 Plb. 22.20.1.
37 Koehn 2007, 62.
38 Anyway, the choice of Apollonis as Attalus’ wife subsequently infl uenced the relationships with 
Miletus. When Eumenes II was honoured by the Ionian League and was supposed to decide on the place of 
receiving the award, as a matter of fact, he chose Miletus, cf. Seibert 1967, 61; Bringmann – von Steuben 
1995, 349–353, no. 285; Kotsidu 2000, 296–297, no. 200.
39 Paus. 10.2.6; cf. Strab. 9.421. As regards Attalus’ stoa, see Schalles 1985, 104–126; Hintzen-Bohlen 
1992, 122–127; Bernhard 1993, 136–144; Scheer 2003, 222.
40 According to myths, Telephus was the son of Heracles and an Arcadian princess who, banished by her 
father, gave birth to her son in Mysia. In this way, the Attalids gained a purely Greek ancestor, and one who 
descended through Heracles from Zeus, the king of the gods himself.
41 An additional link to Alexander the Great was Pergamos, chosen by the Attalids as their legendary 
founder. Pergamos was supposedly the king of the Epirote Molossians. Invited by Telephus’ grandson, 
he came to Mysia. There, he assumed power and changed the name of the capital city to Pergamum. In 
this way, the Attalids were supposed to be related to the Epirote royal family, i.e. for instance Olympias, 
Alexander’s mother. For the Attalid mythology and other possibilities which Telephus and Pergamos offered 
(e.g. including the Attalids in the oldest Hellenic tradition through references to Homer’s epic stories and the 
Trojan War), see Scheer 1993, 71–73, 127–128; 2003, 221–226; Kosmetatou 1995, 138–144; 2003, 167–168; 
Gruen 2000, 22–27. For Dionysus Cathegemon, see Michels 2011, 125–139.
42 Scheer 2003, 223. Delos played an important role in the Attalids’ religious-mythological propaganda. 
Attalus founded on Delos a cleverly designed monument, the so-called “Theuthrania offering.” The monument 
consisted of a group of fi ve or six statues. The statues of Eumenes I and Attalus I were accompanied by the 
images of local Mysian heroes and, probably, of Philetaerus: IG XI 4.1107; 1108; 1206–1208; Robert 1973; 
Schalles 1985, 127–135; Bringmann – von Steuben 1995, 218–221, no. 172; Scheer 2003, 221–222.
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Undoubtedly, the attractiveness of the king of Pergamum in the Greeks’ eyes was best 
enhanced by his military successes. In the 230s, the wars that he waged were defensive 
in nature. It was only in the years 230–223 that his actions assumed a more military 
character, exceeding the borderlines of the state that he had inherited from Eumenes I.43 
Polybius (4.48.7) overestimated the king’s successes when writing that he had captured 
the whole country “on this side of the Taurus mountains.” But indeed, Pergamum’s ruler 
wielded infl uence in a large part of the Seleucids’ territory, most of all, in Lydia and Hel-
lespontic Phrygia.44 Importantly, the military actions must have been supported by dip-
lomatic activity. As a matter of fact, after his success, Attalus faced the problem of hand-
ling the relationships with the local cities. We can conclude that the king of Pergamum 
applied a very fl exible approach and, depending upon the region, the importance of the 
city and his own abilities, employed different solutions to the problem in question.45 As 
far as can be concluded from Polybius’ account concerning Attalus’ expedition in 218, 
but containing information useful for the reconstruction of the previous relationships, 
the king imposed more direct control over the cities of Aeolis and Mysia.46 His interfer-
ence in the independence of Teos in southern Ionia was even stronger.47 What becomes 
very evident in the sources is the permanence of his alliances with the cities of Troad. 
Ilium, Lampsacus and Alexandria Troas also in fact remained loyal during the Seleucid 
reconquest of these territories led by Achaeus from 223 onwards.48 Undoubtedly, the 
strong connection between these cities and Pergamum needs to be regarded as Attalus’ 
success – especially considering the fact that there are no sources to indicate the fi rst two 
Attalids’ direct involvement in Troad.49 From the point of view of the cities of Troas, the 
purpose of the treaties drawn up with Attalus was to maintain autonomy not only within 
the area of the internal policy, but also, at least to some extent, in the fi eld of foreign af-
43 Allen 1983, 38–39.
44 Given the scarcity of sources, a precise description of Attalus’ conquest is diffi cult. Perhaps he 
temporarily controlled Pisidia (Kosmetatou 1997, 23). Certainly, he did not reach for Caria. In 227 Antigonus 
Doson organised an expedition to this land (I.Labraunda, no. 7; Plb. 20.5.11; Pompeius Trogus, Prol. 28). The 
king of Macedonia might have been asked for help in the fi ght with Attalus by the local cities or Olympichus, 
the Seleucid governor of Caria, cf. Bengtson 1971, 22–33; Will 1979–1982, I: 366–371; Walbank 1979, 
III: 70–71; Le Bohec 1993, 333–346.
45 Detailed analysis: Allen 1983, 39–58. McShane (1964, 58–91) put forward a daring hypothesis – albeit 
a pointless one, unsupported by any source materials – according to which Attalus reputedly created a kind of 
symmachy, following the example of the Hellenic League established by Antigonus Doson.
46 According to Polybius, Attalus imposed his authority by force of arms, on the same agreements as 
formerly. As indicated by Attalus’ later (of 205) letter to the citizens of Magnesia on the Meander (OGIS 
282 = Welles 1934, no. 34), the cities enjoyed their independence as far as internal matters are concerned. 
However, the king controlled their activity in the outside arena, cf. Allen 1983, 45.
47 Allen 1983, 47–56; Ma 2002, 58, note 25.
48 This is indicated by Polybius’ account (5.78.1–5) referring to Attalus’ expedition in 218. Contra 
Meloni 1949, 536, note 2; 1950, 175, note 2; Schmitt 1964, 165. They both, however, over-interpret Polybius’ 
account, cf. Ma 2002, 56, note 13.
49 We do not know the exact location of the city of Philetaereia, established by Eumenes I. It was 
supposed to be situated at the foot of Mount Ida, which is situated in the borderland between Mysia and Troas. 
According to Magie (1950, 734), it was on the eastern side of the Ida range. Allen (1983, 23, in his opinion, 
the founder was Philetaerus) and Stauber (1996, 11–14) give the location as the northern coast of the bay of 
Adramyttium in the south-east of the Troas, cf. Cohen 1995, 171–172; Kosmetatou 2001, 110–117.
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fairs.50 The cities of Troas, which, like most of the other ones in western Asia Minor, had 
hitherto been dependent on the Seleucids, as a result of the Third Syrian War as well as 
the “War of Brothers” gained the chance to become independent. In a situation in which 
Attalus I became the Seleucids’ main opponent, he proved to be their natural ally. It is 
likely that Attalus was connected by still looser bonds of friendship with Smyrna, which 
remained a free city.51
In 223 the Seleucids’ counteroffensive took place. Initially it was led by Seleucus III, 
and, after his sudden death, by Achaeus, who represented the power of the new king, 
Antiochus III, as a governor of cis-Tauric Asia Minor. Since the acceptance of the dia-
dem in 220, Achaeus had been taking actions on his own. Consequently, Attalus I had 
lost almost all of the conquered territories. Taking advantage of Achaeus’ involvement in 
Pisidia and Pamphylia, in 218 Attalus organised a successful expedition, which resulted 
in his regaining part of the territories that he had lost a few years before. Achaeus’ reac-
tion was not as effective as in the years 223–222.52
In 220 Byzantium strove to gain Attalus’ and Achaeus’ support in the war which it 
waged with Rhodes. Yet this does not prove that the agreement between Attalus and 
Achaeus took place at this time.53 A careful analysis of the text by Polybius does not con-
fi rm such a suggestion.54 However, the episode in question casts some light on the king 
of Pergamum’s attitude towards the Rhodians. According to Polybius, the confl ict re-
sulted from Byzantium raising the customs tax levied on the ships which passed through 
the Hellespont. Supposedly, they were forced to take this step by the necessity to pay 
a tribute to the Galatian Kingdom of Tylis.55 It is possible, however, that the reasons 
were deeper, and there was in fact a trade war in which Byzantium was trying to increase 
its share of the profi ts from trade with Black Sea cities. Rhodes, thanks to its strategic 
position, played a key role in the transit trade in the eastern waters of the Mediterranean 
Sea, and gradually built its expansive trade contacts. Additionally, it tried to expand its 
dominions on the mainland and its infl uence on the Aegean Islands.56 The Rhodians 
also gained the support of Pergamum’s enemy, Prusias II, king of Bithynia, during this 
war.57 The support given by the Rhodians to the Seleucids and the Antigonids during 
the Second Syrian War was also defi nitely not to the Attalids’ liking.58 It is also telling 
that Attalus was not among the kings and states which supported the Rhodians after the 
50 Kosmetatou 2001, 118. 
51 Plb. 5.77.6. Smyrna also remained loyal to Attalus during the attack of Seleucus III and Achaeus.
52 Plb. 4.48; 5.77–78; cf. Hansen 1971, 40–43; Ma 2002, 54–59; Evans 2012, 20–21; Chrubasik 2016, 
83–84. Around 223–222 Ptolemy III sent Attalus some support (P. Haun. 6, frg. 1; cf. Huss 1977; Beyer-
Rotthoff 1993, 72–73). The expedition was an episode in terms of the Ptolemies’ military involvement in the 
war in Asia Minor. It proved, however, the political support that Attalus was provided with.
53 Establishing such a peace or an agreement was assumed, among many others, by Schmitt 1964, 262; 
Hansen 1971, 40; Allen 1983, 37; Heinen 1984, 431.
54 Detailed analysis by Ager 2012. The possibility of establishing such an agreement was also rejected by 
Meloni 1949, 552; McShane 1964, 65, note 23; Ma 2002, 58, note 22.
55 Plb. 4.46.1–48.2.
56 Cf. Fraser – Bean 1954, 138–158; Berthold 1984, 81–101; Reger 1994, 41–43, 62–68; Gabrielsen 
1997, 56–57; Reger 1999, 76–86; Badoud 2014, 115–124.
57 Plb. 4.45.9–47.7; 49.1–5.
58 Lind. Temp. Chron. 37; Polyaen. 5.18.
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disastrous earthquake in 227.59 Consequently, Attalus had plenty of reasons to consider 
assisting the Byzantinians. In the end, however, he did not join the war, probably as he 
was too exhausted from the war with Achaeus.60
A new opening in Asia Minor occurred in 216 when Attalus made an agreement with 
Antiochus III. It was probably not a formal treaty, but an obligation to conduct a tem-
porary military cooperation.61 At the time Antiochus III was preparing for a military en-
counter with Achaeus, whom he considered a usurper who, by assuming a royal title, had 
become a mutual enemy of Antiochus and Attalus. We can only speculate about specifi c 
territorial concessions.62 It seems, however, that Attalus kept only the territories which 
had been previously taken away from him by Achaeus. Establishing an agreement, how-
ever, meant Antiochus’ recognition of the sovereignty of the kingdom of Pergamum. 
The agreement with Antiochus III normalised for several years the relationships between 
the two states, allowing Attalus to focus his attention on other territories – Greece and the
Aegean Sea.63 Attalus’ signifi cant success was establishing closer relationships with
the Greek cities in Asia Minor. This reinforced Pergamum’s position in its relations with the
local opponents. A certain indicator of not only the propaganda skills, but also the diplo-
matic talents displayed by Attalus is Polybius’ most positive assessment.64
ABBREVIATIONS
I.Didyma – A. Rehm, Didyma II: Die Inschriften, Berlin 1958.
IG – Inscriptiones Graecae. 
I.Ilium – P. Frisch, Die Inschriften von Ilion, Bonn 1978.
I.Labraunda – J. Crampa, Labraunda: Swedish Excavations and Researches, vol. III,1: The Greek In-
scriptions, Lund 1969.
I.Milet – C. Fredrich, Das Rathaus von Milet, Berlin 1908.
I.Orop. – V. Petrakos, Les inscriptions d’Oropos, Athens 1997 [in Greek]. 
I.Smyrna – G. Petzl, Die Inschriften von Smyrna, Bonn 1982–1990.
59 Plb. 5.88.1 – 90.4. Polybius gives very specifi c information about the assistance given to the Rhodians. 
He must have used an offi cial Rhodian document, either directly or through the work of one of the local 
historians, cf. Kobes 1993, 6–7. It is impossible that he accidentally overlooked Attalus I.
60 Plb. 4.48.2.
61 Plb. 5.107.4. Polybius uses the term koinopragia (otherwise unknown) to defi ne this agreement. It is 
very likely that its extension was a subsequent agreement between the two rulers, which is mentioned by 
Polybius (21.17.6) in his account concerning the negotiations between Rome and Antiochus III in 189. The 
Greek historian mentions in this context the synthekai between Antiochus and Attalus, according to which 
the former was supposed to return to the then king of Pergamum, Eumenes II 400 talents of debt and corn. 
A similar term is used by Appian (Syr. 38). Unfortunately, the term synthekai is one that we know very little 
about. It is possible that it was a kind of agreement or treaty, the conditions of which were more specifi cally 
defi ned. Cf. Schmitt 1964, 264; Walbank 1979, III: 110; Allen 1983, 58–65; cf. Chrubasik 2013, 96–97.
62 Mysia and Hellespontine Phrygia according to Schmitt (1964, 264–267), and Mysia and Aeolis 
according to Allen (1983, 58–65). Ma (2002, 60) believes that almost the whole of Mysia went to Antiochus III, 
and Attalus was left only with those territories which he managed to save during the war against Achaeus.
63 As early as 210, the king of Pergamum joined the war between Rome and Macedonia.
64 Plb. 18.41.1–10.
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